An Empirical Study on Benchmarks of Artificial Software Vulnerabilities by Geng, Sijia et al.
An Empirical Study on Benchmarks of Artificial
Software Vulnerabilities
Sijia Geng∗ Yuekang Li† Yunlan Du∗ Jun Xu‡ Yang Liu† Bing Mao∗
∗Nanjing University
†Nanyang Technological University
‡Stevens Institute of Technology
Abstract—Recently, various techniques (e.g., fuzzing) have
been developed for vulnerability detection. To evaluate those
techniques, the community has been developing benchmarks of
artificial vulnerabilities because of a shortage of ground-truth.
However, people have concerns that such vulnerabilities cannot
represent reality and may lead to unreliable and misleading
results. Unfortunately, there lacks research on handling such
concerns.
In this work, to understand how close these benchmarks
mirror reality, we perform an empirical study on three artificial
vulnerability benchmarks - LAVA-M, Rode0day and CGC (2669
bugs) and various real-world memory-corruption vulnerabilities
(80 CVEs). Furthermore, we propose a model to depict the
properties of memory-corruption vulnerabilities. Following this
model, we conduct intensive experiments and data analyses. Our
analytic results reveal that while artificial benchmarks attempt
to approach the real world, they still significantly differ from
reality. Based on the findings, we propose a set of strategies to
improve the quality of artificial benchmarks.
Index Terms—Artificial Vulnerability, Empirical Study, Vul-
nerability Understanding, Vulnerability Detection Tools
I. INTRODUCTION
Software vulnerability has long been a fundamental threat
against computer security. To alleviate this situation, tremen-
dous research has been conducted on developing techniques
to find software vulnerabilities. In the last five years, over 60
papers about vulnerability detection have been published on
top conferences of cyber security and software engineering [1].
To comprehensively measure the utility and understand the
limitations of techniques of vulnerability detection, the com-
munity has been developing artificial benchmarks of software
vulnerabilities. People compose such benchmarks by either in-
jecting vulnerabilities into existing programs [2, 3] or crafting
artificial vulnerable programs [4]. Compared with benchmarks
consisting of real-world programs, artificial benchmarks have
two advantages. On the one hand, artificial benchmarks can
provide ground truth of vulnerabilities, which is essential for
the evaluation of vulnerability coverage. On the other hand,
artificial benchmarks can synthesize diversities around the
vulnerabilities. Such diversities can evaluate the generality of
vulnerability detection techniques.
Despite the above advantages, while some bug finding tools
perform well on artificial benchmarks, they may not perform
well in real-world programs. For example, Wang et al.[5] find
that although Angora (a new mutation-based fuzzer) can detect
almost all the bugs that inserted by LAVA while AFL performs
worse, for some real-world vulnerabilities, AFL can discover
more vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2017-6966, CVE-2018-11416,
CVE-2017-13741) than Angora within 24 hours across 8
runs. So researchers are hesitating with adopting artificial
vulnerability benchmarks, concerning that these benchmarks
insufficiently represent reality and thus, evaluation using such
benchmarks is unreliable or even misleading. Unfortunately,
there lacks research on handling such concerns in the litera-
ture.
In this work, we aim to understand the validity of artificial
benchmarks. Our methodology is to compare the mainstream
benchmarks of artificial vulnerabilities with real-world vulner-
abilities and focus on the following questions and seek answers
through our study:
Q1. How do artificial vulnerabilities differ from real-world
vulnerabilities? Can current artificial vulnerabilities suffi-
ciently mirror the reality?
Q2. What can we find by modifying the artificial benchmarks
according to what we have observed from Q1?
Q3. What improvements can we make towards more realistic
artificial vulnerabilities benchmarks?
To answer the above questions, we develop a general model
that captures the essential properties of vulnerabilities. This
model depicts the properties of memory corruption vulnerabil-
ities, together with how the properties influence the evaluation
on the vulnerability detection tools, as we will detail in Sec-
tion III. Following this model, we carry out our experiments
and summarize answers to the above three questions. In short,
our study reveals that while artificial benchmarks attempt to
approach the real world, they still differ from the reality.
For Q1, we found that the artificial benchmarks created by
injecting bugs do not capture the key properties of real-world
vulnerabilities in terms of bug requirements and vulnerability
types. For Q2, we found that the artificial bugs cannot mirror
the reality well because they may not fairly reflect the program
state coverage of the vulnerability detection tool. For Q3, we
propose several strategies to make artificial benchmarks more
realistic based on our analyses and experiments.
In summary, our major contributions are four-fold as fol-
lows.
• First, to the best of our knowledge, we perform the first
in-depth empirical study on the analysis of benchmarks
of artificial vulnerabilities with manual verifications and
confirmations. Our large-scale analysis covers 2669 ar-
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tificial bugs and 80 real-world vulnerabilities, which is
the most comprehensive comparison between artificial
vulnerabilities and real-world ones.
• Second, we develop a general model to describe essen-
tial software vulnerabilities, together with how the bug
requirements influence the evaluation on the vulnerability
detection tools.
• Third, our results provide quantitative evidence on the
differences between artificial and real-world vulnerabili-
ties from some properties (e.g., requirements to trigger a
vulnerability). Also, we identify how the properties influ-
ence the evaluation of vulnerability detection techniques.
• Fourth, we modify the benchmarks to make it more
realistic according to what we have observed on control
flow and data flow. We also propose new improvements
toward making artificial benchmarks more realistic.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we start by introducing the background of
security vulnerabilities and benchmarks we study. We then
proceed to describe our research goals.
A. Memory Corruption Vulnerability
A memory corruption vulnerability is a security vulnera-
bility that allows attackers to manipulate in-memory content
to crash a program or obtain unauthorized access to a system.
Memory corruption vulnerabilities such as ”Buffer-Overflow”,
”Null-Pointer-Dereference” and ”Use-After-Free”, have been
ranked among the most dangerous software errors [6].
B. Benchmarks of Artificial Software Vulnerabilities
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Fig. 1: An overview of how LAVA plants bugs.
In spite of decades of research in bug detection tools, there
is a surprising dearth of ground-truth corpora that can be used
to evaluate the efficacy of such tools. The lack of ground-truth
datasets means that it is difficult to perform large-scale studies
of bug discovery.
To comprehensively measure the utility and understand the
limitations of vulnerability detection techniques, the commu-
nity has been developing artificial benchmarks of vulnerabili-
ties. In recent years, three widely-used artificial vulnerability
databases have sought to address the need for ground-truth
benchmark and there are two categories of them. LAVA-M and
Rode0day inject large numbers of bugs into program source
code automatically and include similar bugs structurally. And
DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) contains a series of
fairly small programs with known bugs written by security
experts. In this part, we will briefly provide background
information on the artificial vulnerabilities before introducing
our study.
LAVA is a prevalent ground-truth corpus generator, which
can efficiently and automatically add memory corruption bugs
into C/C++ programs on demand. LAVA currently concen-
trates on injecting Buffer-Overflow bugs and produces corre-
sponding proof-of-concept inputs as their triggers [2].
Figure 1 presents an overview of LAVA. When LAVA
obtains the source code and series of input files of the program,
it finds unused portions of the input by running the program
with dynamic taint analysis [7] on each specific input. This
data parts of the inputs bytes are dead (i.e., it does not
influence control flow), uncomplicated (not modified), and
available, namely DUAs. Since DUAs are often a direct copy
of input bytes and can be set to any chosen value without
sending the program along a different path, LAVA intends to
regard them as candidate triggers for memory corruption. At
the DUA site, code is inserted to copy the DUA’s value into
a global variable via a call to lava_set. Then LAVA finds
potential attack points (ATPs), which is a program instruction
involving a memory read or write whose pointer can be
modified and must occur temporally after a DUA along the
program execution. LAVA introduces a dataflow relationship
between DUA and ATP along the trace by modifying the
source code as follows and at the attack point, lava_get
retrieves the value, compares it to the trigger value (magic
number). If the condition is met, then a buffer-overflow will
occur.
LAVA-M, generated by LAVA, is one of the datasets in our
study. It is a benchmark of artificial software vulnerabilities
that injected more than one bug at a time into the source code
and used widely to evaluate vulnerability detection tools [8,
9, 10, 11].
Rode0day [3] is a recurring bug finding contest, which
is also a benchmark to evaluate vulnerability discovery tech-
niques. In the Rode0day contest, the successful detection of
memory error vulnerabilities is demonstrated in the form of a
simple crash. Evolved from LAVA, Rode0day uses automated
bug insertion to generate new error assemblies in the form
of standard 32-bit Linux ELF files, to help evaluate the
performance of vulnerability detection tools.
CGC [4], a competition among autonomous vulnerability
analysis systems, is a widely adopted benchmark in recent
studies [9, 10, 11, 12]. This competition resulted in a collection
of small programs with known vulnerabilities and triggering
inputs. Each challenge of CGC contains one or more bugs,
which are deliberately devised by security experts to evaluate
vulnerability detection tools.
C. Motivations
While existing works focus on proposing new benchmarks
that can be used to evaluate the efficacy of vulnerability
detection tools [2, 3, 4, 13, 14], there is a lack of sys-
tematic understanding of whether the artificial vulnerabilities
can represent the real-world vulnerabilities. Although other
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works suggest that some widely-used benchmarks, like LAVA-
M, Rode0day and CGC are different from real-world bugs
in several ways [13, 14, 15], they did not provide in-depth
analysis of the benchmarks. Moreover, there is also an absence
of analysis on how the different properties of the bench-
mark vulnerabilities can reflect the different features of the
vulnerability detection tools. Also, analyzing the differences
between artificial and real-world vulnerabilities can help to
create more realistic benchmarks for tool evaluation. Thus,
we propose a study to provide a first in-depth understanding
of similarities and differences between artificial and real-world
vulnerabilities while exploring solutions to make artificial bugs
more realistic.
III. MODEL OVERVIEW
In this paper, we focus on the memory corruption vulnera-
bility, which is the majority of software security defects [16].
Instead of discussing the vulnerabilities case by case, we
propose a general model to describe the memory corruption
vulnerabilities by summarizing the requirements for triggering
the vulnerability. Besides the model for vulnerabilities, we
also propose a model to represent the different features of
the vulnerability detection tool and how they are affected by
the components of the vulnerability model. This is because
the goal of the benchmarks is to evaluate the vulnerability
detection tools. So we further extend the vulnerability model
by adding the relations with the properties of the vulnerability
detection tool. Figure 2 depicts our model, in which the cyan
boxes represent the main components of a bug and the gray
boxes are the properties of the vulnerability detection tools.
This model provides a systematic basis for our experiments
and analyses. Here we discuss the model in detail.
From Figure 2, we can see that a typical memory corruption
vulnerability happens like this: first, the target program is
fed with a malicious input; then, the program must contain
bugs/vulnerabilities which can be triggered by the malicious
input; last, after the vulnerability is triggered successfully, the
program will behave unexpectedly.
Triggering the unexpected behaviour is the coaction of the
malicious input and the vulnerability inside the program. In
our model, we focus on the requirements for the program
to become vulnerable. Such requirements are called bug
requirements in our model. The bug requirements can be
summarized as follows. To trigger the vulnerability, we need
to feed a specific input to the buggy program. This input
can be in different forms, such as a file, a series of user
actions or a stream of data, but it should satisfy the following
two conditions. ¶ By executing this input, the control flow
must reach the buggy location in the program. Nevertheless,
the reachability problem is hindering the detection of most
vulnerabilities. For example, the control flow needs to go
through a series of complex conditions and the data flow needs
to go through a series of data transformations. · In further,
this input may have to lead the program’s execution to the
location with a specific program state. In other words, only
reaching the buggy location is not enough. For example, for
a Use-After-Free vulnerability, the program may have reached
the location of the buggy “use” without passing through
the corresponding “free”. In this case, the vulnerability is
not triggered. To trigger the Use-After-Free vulnerability, the
program must reach the “use” from the path where the “free”
has been called. To summarize, a vulnerability is triggered
when the buggy program is fed with an input that can help to
reach the buggy location with a specific program state.
After triggering the vulnerability, the buggy program will
behave unexpectedly in different ways. The program may run
into Buffer-Overflow, Null-Pointer-Dereference, Use-After-
Free, etc. and harm the software and system.
Since the goal of the artificial benchmarks is to evaluate
different properties of vulnerability detection tools, our model
also shows how the different components of vulnerabilities
are connected with the properties of tools. Both reaching the
buggy location and triggering specific states require the tool
to use some strategies to solve the control-flow and data-flow
constraints to have a larger program state coverage. Also,
some unexpected behaviours of the buggy programs require
the tool to be sensitive enough to detect. For example, if a
tool can only detect one type of vulnerability and other types
cannot detect, then the tool is insensitive. So the vulnerability
types can evaluate the sensitivity of tools.
To sum up, the high-level model contains the above proper-
ties mentioned and forms the basis of our study. Following
the general model, we design our information extraction
methodology in Section IV and discuss the details of three
research questions in Section V.
IV. DATASETS AND METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the dataset for our experiments
and high-level information extraction methodology.
A. Datasets
TABLE I: Dataset overview.
Dataset Real World LAVA-M Rode0day CGC Total
Bugs Number 80 587 1963 119 2749
Artificial Benchmarks. We choose three widely-used arti-
ficial benchmarks, which are LAVA-M, Rode0day and CGC.
LAVA-M and Rode0day inject bugs into programs automat-
ically. We collect 587 bugs in LAVA-M and 1963 bugs in
Rode0day. And LAVA-M insert bugs into 4 open-source pro-
grams (base64, md5sum, uniq and who) while Rode0day
insert bugs into 9 programs. For CGC, the specialist-written
benchmark, we select 93 challenges with 119 memory corrup-
tion bugs (Table I).
Real-world programs. We analyze 80 representative
CVEs [17] which are from 40 different open-source software
products (eg. ngnix, openjpeg, perl, php). The reason
that we focus on memory corruption vulnerabilities is be-
cause of their high severity and significant real-world impact.
We list the CVE-IDs of 80 real-word vulnerabilities at the
website [18]. We obtained the types from the CVE entry’s
description or its references.
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Vulnerability Detection Tool
Vulnerability 
Buffer-Oveflow Null-Pointer-Dereference
Unexpected Behaviours
Use-After-Free ...
Malicious InputBuggy Program
feed to
lead to
Reaching The Buggy Location
Triggering The Specific States
Program State
Coverage Sensitivity
Fig. 2: The model for memory corruption vulnerability and vulnerability detection tool.
B. Creation of the dataset
Note that, the distribution of different category of memory
corruption vulnerabilities nearly follows the statistics we col-
lect from the real world, which is shown in Table IV. To make
the real-world vulnerabilities more extensive and the analytic
results more general, we divide the vulnerabilities into 5 times
bins(3 - year period) whose over-time trend of our dataset
relatively consistent with that of the entire CVE dataset [19].
To sum up, the creation of the dataset is consist with the afore-
mentioned aspects and the real-world circumstances, hence the
dataset is of rationality and representativeness. The 80 real-
world vulnerabilities with CVE-IDs are shown at the website.
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Fig. 3: Real-world vulner-
ability type of our dataset.
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C. Methodology
We use different tools to collect the necessary data for our
analysis. The overall workflow for our data collection is shown
in Figure 5. As described in the workflow, we need to collect
unexpected behaviors and code execution trace.
For the unexpected behaviors, we can obtain the types from
the short description about the vulnerability and a list of
external references on CVE website [17], which maintains a
list of known vulnerabilities that have obtained a CVE ID.
To take a deeper look into how the vulnerabilities occur
and obtain the conditions for reaching the buggy locations
and triggering the specific states, we need to collect the
execution trace of the vulnerability. For this purpose, we need
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*  Path Conditions
*  Specific States
Extracted Information
*  Unexpected Behaviors
Artificial Benchmarks
Real-world CVEs 
Fig. 5: Workflow of the analyses of benchmarks and real-world
vulnerabilities.
to recompile the programs and reproduce the vulnerabilities for
their execution trace. For all benchmarks, we first recompile
these programs with gcov flag — a tool used in conjunction
with GCC, to get the code coverage in programs. Then we
run the programs with the vulnerability inputs to get the code
coverage report and a typical code coverage report is shown
in Figure 6. From the report, we can obtain the file name, the
total and hit code lines and functions number, and the line
coverage and function coverage of each program. With the
report, we can further extract the code execution traces of the
vulnerabilities. An example of the extracted execution trace
is shown in Figure 7. In the code execution trace, the lines
of code which have been executed are marked pink, while
the unexecuted lines are marked green. For the 80 CVEs, we
collect all the vulnerability reports for each CVE and set up the
operating system and environment. Because the vulnerabilities
are different for each case and cannot be automated, it took
us a lot of manpower(e.g., triggering and analyzing the crash
step by step) to reproduce and analyze the vulnerabilities. We
manually analyze the path conditions along the trace and the
specific states to fulfil for triggering the bug.
V. ANALYSIS RESULTS
We will give our analytic results about the comparisons
between artificial benchmarks and real-world ones, and answer
to the three research questions.
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Fig. 6: An example of code coverage report generated by
gcov in base64 of LAVA-M.
Fig. 7: An example of program execution trace in
base64 of LAVA-M.
A. (Q1) How do artificial vulnerabilities differ from real-
world vulnerabilities? Can artificial vulnerabilities sufficiently
mirror the reality?
We depict the differences from two aspects: requirements
to trigger a vulnerability and unexpected behaviour types
of the buggy programs.
1) Requirements to trigger a vulnerability: As our model
mentioned, a crash needs two requirements which are reaching
the buggy location and triggering specific states along the
execution trace.
a) Reach the buggy location: Along the program execu-
tion, the input must meet a certain number of path conditions
in terms of control flow and data flow to reach the buggy
location. Some of the paths are protected by magic bytes
comparisons, and can only be reached when the detection
tools solve the corresponding constraints. Also, the input may
be go through some data transformations(e.g., arithmetic and
hash operations). So we first analyze the types and proportions
of magic numbers in the constraints. Then we analyze the
proportion of data transformation in the trace between artificial
benchmarks and real-world vulnerabilities.
¶The types and proportions of magic numbers.
Magic numbers refer to the bytes in the test input which are
uses in comparison instructions. The types of magic numbers
influence the difficulty of solving the comparisons. We sum-
marize the types of magic numbers and their proportions in
Table II. For our dataset, the comparisons in LAVA-M and
Rode0day cover only two types and are almost 32-bit. In
contrast, CGC and real-world programs have various types of
magic numbers. When we further study the proportion of each
type, we find that though LAVA-M and Rode0Day put nearly
90% of their efforts on the type of int32, it only accounts
for 17% in the real world.
To summarize, since the distribution and the types of magic
numbers in LAVA-M and Rode0day are far away from the
real-world vulnerabilities, they may not evaluate the ability to
solve constraints of the vulnerability detection tools as fairly
as the real world. As CGC is written by specialists, their magic
numbers can be designed more freely and seem more realistic.
·The proportion of data transformation in the trace.
Data transformation means the arithmetic or hash operations
that the input may have gone through. We analyze the input’s
transformation along the program execution between artificial
benchmarks and real-world vulnerabilities. At the points where
LAVA-M and Rode0day insert bugs, the values of magic
numbers are often the direct copies of inputs without any data
TABLE II: Magic number type of datasets.
Magic Number
Type LAVA-M Rode0day CGC Real World
char 8% 10% 40% 51%
string - 3% 29% 26%
float - - 5% -
unsigned int16 - - 0.5% 1%
unsigned int32 - - 3% 4%
unsigned int64 - - 0.5% -
int32 92% 87% 21.5% 17%
long int - - 0.5% 1%
transformation. Our statistics of the real world and CGC in
Table III show that 61.8% of inputs in real-world programs
have data transformations, including but not limited to type
conversion, casting the integer to the character or doing
inversely and bit-wise operation in real-world. As to CGC,
only 40% of them have data transformations along the trace,
where type conversion is the majority.
TABLE III: The proportion of data transformation of datasets.
Dataset Transformation Non-Transformation
LAVA-M 0% 100%
Rode0day 8% 92%
CGC 40.0% 60.0%
Real World 61.8% 38.2%
b) Trigger specific program states: As have mentioned
before, since LAVA-M and Rode0day artificially construct the
relation between DUA and ATP, the execution trace to trigger
the vulnerability must fulfill the series of path conditions
designated by them, including the magic number guarded at
the last path comparison. As to LAVA-M, once the magic
number of the last if-condition is solved out, the program will
crash immediately without any specific state to be triggered
along the trace. Though Rode0day has improved LAVA by
using multiple DUAs in the last conditions to complicate
the comparisons, its vulnerability triggering mechanism still
excludes any specific state.
The vulnerabilities in the real world and CGC reveal the
opposite feature at the time of crash. To make a memory
corruption vulnerability, it must go through some specific
states and trigger that. For example, as for Buffer-Overflow
vulnerability, the program should read or write a longer size
of data to the buffer allocated, that is, if it triggers the specific
states, the program will crash successfully. As for use-after-
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free vulnerability, before the pointer used, it must be freed
first, which triggers a specific state.
1 void receive_input(FILE *f){
2 ...
3 char buf[1024];
4 fread(buf, 1024, 1, f);
5 lava_set(*(int *)buf);
6 ...
7 }
8 ...
9 void foo(char *bar){
10 // BUG:
11
12 printf("%s\n", bar + lava_get() *
13 (lava_get() == 0x6176616c));
14 }
Fig. 8: A bug inserted by LAVA-M.
1 void ReadFace(fbuf){
2 ...
3 t = s = fbuf;
4 if(...){
5 char buffer[128];
6 sscanf(s, "%s %s", buffer);}
7 ...
8 c = (int)* (s++);
9 if((c >= '0') && (c <= '9'))
10 ...
Fig. 9: A buffer overflow vulnerability in CVE-2009-2286.
In the following, we present a detailed case study to
illustrate the difference in triggering specific states between
benchmarks and real-world vulnerabilities.
Figure 8 shows an example bug inserted by LAVA-M. The
function lava_get retrieves the value last stored by a call to
lava_set. Once the magic number 0x6176616c is solved
out, the program will crash even without any specific state to
be triggered as the highlighted code line 12 and 13.
As for real world, taking CVE-2009-2286 in Figure 9
as an example, we can observe that when the input solely
reaches the last condition if((c>=’0’)&&(c<=’9’)) as
the highlighted code line 9, the buffer overflow vulnerability
in ReadFace may not be triggered. Unless triggering the
specific state in the highlighted code line 5, that is, the size of
input is longer than 128 that the buffer allocated, the program
will only crash successfully.
From the case study, we can draw the conclusion that the
bugs artificially inserted by LAVA-M and Rode0day, their
triggering conditions are deliberately designed and do not
include specific states to trigger, which distinct from the true
circumstances under the real world. Such design may not well
evaluate the ability of program state coverage exploration for
vulnerability detection tools.
2) Unexpected behaviour types: Unexpected behaviour
types, also called vulnerability type, can evaluate the sen-
sitivity of vulnerability detection tools. If the tools are less
effective, they can not detect diverse vulnerability types.
For the vulnerabilities of real world, we look up to the
5 most common memory corruption vulnerabilities in real
world [20]. As Table IV shows, the top 3 bugs type of CGC are
Out-of-Bounds Write, Out-of-Bounds Read, and Null-Pointer-
Dereference, which account for 37.8%, 22.7% and 20.2% of
the total bugs we collected respectively. Compared to the real
world, however, the same bug types only account for 3.4%,
8.6% and 5.0% respectively, which indicates the great differ-
ence of the bug type distribution between CGC and real world.
Though CGC has many types of bugs, the percents are much
less than the real-world circumstances. A probable reason why
CGC has more Out-of-Bounds Writing and Reading bugs is
that they are easier to create. As mentioned above, LAVA and
Rode0day can inject only buffer overflow bugs into programs.
The benchmarks that lack diversity in inserted bugs may not
well evaluate the sensitivity of vulnerability detection tools,
since certain bugs excluded from the benchmarks may not be
detected by some less effective tools.
TABLE IV: The 5 most common software weaknesses of
memory corruption vulnerabilities in real world [20], and the
number of them in CGC.
Weakness
Summary
Real-World
Num (Percentage)
CGC
Num (Percentage)
1 Buffer-Overflow 12293 (76.3%) 14 (11.7%)
2 Out-of-Bounds Read 1390 (8.6%) 27 (22.7%)
3 Use-After-Free 1079 (6.7%) 9 (7.6%)
4 Null-Pointer-Dereference 805 (5.0%) 24 (20.2%)
5 Out-of-Bounds Write 548 (3.4%) 45 (37.8%)
Though some of the features share similarities, there still
exist significant differences between artificial benchmarks
and reality, which may influence the evaluation of the
vulnerability detection tools.
B. (Q2) What can we find by modifying the artificial bench-
marks according to what we have observed from Q1?
The above analytic results indicate that the vulnerability
features in the artificial benchmarks differ greatly from the
real world. Thus, we further carry on a series of experiments
to evaluate how these differences will affect the utilities of
vulnerability detection tools. We modify the artificial bench-
marks in accordance with the features we summarized for the
real-world vulnerabilities, and test them with the vulnerability
detection tool AFL [21]. Our experiments are only conducted
on LAVA-M because Rode0day is evolved from LAVA with
a similarly unsatisfactory manifestation in our model, while
CGC is written by specialists and its features are close to the
reality in most metrics.
First, we modify the program in LAVA-M to make it more
realistic from the following aspects: ¶We extend the magic
number types to char, string and int32 (we omit the
types that account for less than 5% in Table II) by modifying
if conditions, with a similar proportion to real-world cases.
·We add extra data transformation to the DUAs before they
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are compared to the magic number. ¸We combine both the
above modifications.
Considering the high similarity between the LAVA-inserted
bugs in different programs, we only modify base64 in
LAVA-M. After applying these modifications, we obtain 3 dif-
ferent versions of base64, and run AFL on them respectively,
as well as the original base64 in LAVA-M. Each of the
experiments is repeated 5 times to mitigate the randomness
of fuzzing and lasts for 5 hours to align with [2, 9, 10].
Lastly, we collect the unique crashes detected by AFL in
the experiments to evaluate the effects of the modifications.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
time (min)
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as
h 
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if-dt
Fig. 10: Crashes detected by AFL in 5 hours. The shaded area
is the 95% confidence interval. “if” means the if conditions
are modified; “dt” means data transformation is added; “if-dt”
means both are modified; “orig” means original base64.
Figure 10 shows the average number of unique crashes
detected by AFL during the experiments. We can see that
modifying the if conditions makes it much easier for AFL to
detect the bugs. This is because almost half of the comparisons
in real-world cases are char comparisons, which are easier
for AFL to penetrate. Adding data transformations makes
it harder for AFL to detect bugs. In fact, AFL detects no
bug in this version of base64. However, the difference
between this version and the original version is minor as the
95% confidence intervals overlap and the p-value of Mann-
Whitney U test is 0.212, above 0.05. Because the bugs are
already hard for AFL to detect, making it harder does not
cause big differences. The version applying both if conditions
modification and data transformation addition is closest to
real-world cases. The number of unique crashes detected is
between the other 2 modified versions as expected. However,
the results on this realistic version differ very much from the
results on the original version as the confidences intervals are
discrete and the p-value is 0.005, below 0.05. The results of
the experiments show that the artificial bugs cannot mirror the
reality well because they may not fairly reflect the properties
of the vulnerability detection tool.
Through the above analysis, we can see the benchmarks
and the real-world vulnerabilities have different manifes-
tations on our model and can not evaluate vulnerability
detection tools well in the aspects of program state
coverage and sensitivity.
C. (Q3) What improvements can we make towards more
realistic artificial vulnerabilities benchmarks?
In this section, we discuss how to make the artificial bench-
mark more realistic based on the program perspective and
vulnerability. We can: ¶ add different types of magic numbers.
This is because we find that the magic bytes which are uses in
comparison instructions are diverse and they are a range but
not a definite number. Adding a hard-to-match magic number
along the path can make it harder to vulnerability techniques
for detection but cannot represent the path conditions in real-
world programs. · add some data transformations along the
execution trace of vulnerabilities. We found that the input data
goes through data transformations on real-world vulnerabili-
ties. This is complementary to distributing the path conditions,
which also helps to test out the program coverage capability
of vulnerability detection tools. ¸ set proper special states
as requirements for triggering the artificial vulnerabilities. We
found that only reaching the buggy location is often not
enough to trigger the vulnerabilities in real-world cases. An
artificial vulnerability should have a certain program state as
its prerequisite to better represent the real-world case. This
can help to test out the program state exploration capability
of the vulnerability detection tools and is complementary to
the two previous suggestions which are related to making
the buggy location hard to reach. ¹ add different types of
vulnerabilities. Different types of vulnerabilities often require
different approaches for effective detection. This can help to
test the versatility and sensitivity of the detection tool.
With the model and the analysis of different artificial
benchmarks as well as programs, we provide suggestions
from the vulnerability perspectives for building a more
realistic benchmark.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
There are some potential threats to the validity of this study.
Foremost is simply the representative of all memory corruption
vulnerabilities in real world. We believe, however, that we have
chosen a representative set of real-world vulnerabilities and we
will argue from four aspects.
Vulnerability Type. The first potential threat is the limited
scope of the study in terms of the vulnerability types. In this
paper, we focus on the memory corruption vulnerabilities as
they have been ranked among the most dangerous software
errors [6] due to their high severity and real-world impact [16].
There are more than 10,000 memory corruption vulnerabilities
listed on the CVE website. We crawled the pages of the
current 95K+ entries (2001-2017) and analyzed their severity
scores (CVSS). Our result shows that the average CVSS score
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for memory corruption vulnerabilities is 7.6, which is clearly
higher than the overall average (6.2), confirming their severity.
Justifications on the Dataset Size. The second potential
threat to validity is that the size of our dataset, specifically
the number of real-world vulnerabilities. We select 80 CVEs
as real-world vulnerabilities and argue that the size of our
dataset is reasonably large. For example, recent work that uses
vulnerabilities in the CVE list to evaluate their vulnerability
detection systems are limited to less than 10 vulnerabili-
ties [22, 23, 24, 25], due to the manual efforts needed to build
ground truth data. So considering both the number and manual
efforts, we believe the size of dataset is enough.
Others. Among the three most-used artificial benchmarks,
although CGC is the closest to the real-world vulnerabili-
ties, it also has some shortcomings. For example, we obtain
cyclomatic complexity (CCN) of the programs in artificial
benchmarks and real world. If the source code contained more
control-flow statements (conditionals or decision points), the
complexity would be more. The results show that the average
CCN values of Rode0day (9.1), LAVA-M (8.6), and real-world
programs (8.1) are higher than the value of CGC (5.2). The
median CCN values of LAVA-M and Rode0day are similar to
real-world ones because they exactly insert vulnerabilities to
real-world programs. The result indicates the logic inside these
specialists’ crafts (CGC) is simpler than the real-world cases.
We need to do much more exploratory analysis to determine
how it influence the vulnerabilities hidden in the small-sized
benchmarks to be detected by vulnerability detection tools
compared with the real-world ones.
VII. RELATED WORK
Since this work is the first one to systematically study
the artificial and real-world vulnerabilities and explain how
benchmarks evaluate the vulnerability detection tools, we
focus on the related work from three categories: the artificial
benchmarks, studies about real-world vulnerabilities and the
vulnerability detection tools.
Artificial Benchmarks. There are some artificial bench-
marks to evaluate vulnerability detection tools [2, 3, 4, 13,
14, 15]. Besides the three most-used benchmarks we study,
Evilcoder [14] automatically find potentially vulnerable source
code locations and transform benign code into vulnerable code.
Bug Synthesis [13] uses constraint-based program synthesis to
automatically inject bugs. Unlike the above works which focus
on building new benchmarks, we concentrate on systematically
studying the differences between the three most-used artificial
benchmarks and real-world vulnerabilities.
Studies of Real-world Vulnerabilities Several works have
been proposed to study the properties of real-world vul-
nerabilities [26, 27, 28]. Their main purposes are different
from ours. They focus on detecting real-world vulnerabilities
with the metrics while we focus on comparing real-world
vulnerabilities with artificial bugs.
Vulnerability Detection Tools. The major purpose of
benchmarks is to evaluate vulnerability detection tools. Rise of
the HaCRS [29] and Driller [8] use CGC as the benchmark.
VUzzer [10], Steelix [9] and QSYM [30] use LAVA-M as
the ground-truth. But few published vulnerability detection
tools use Rode0day for evaluation because it is a very recent
work. The aforementioned tools also use real-world programs
as ground truth, like nm, objdump and gif2png, etc.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
Our future work primarily focuses on implementing a new
benchmark. For example, our findings suggest that adding
data transformations along the trace and making a uniform
difficulty for reaching path conditions are more realistic for
creating bugs artificially. Broadening the diversity of types of
bugs and injecting exploitable bugs explicitly are also future
directions for our work.
Moreover, we will explore the current state of vulnerability
discovery and software security based on our analysis results,
like what properties make a given bug difficult to find and what
types of bugs are currently missed by existing vulnerability
finding tools. This can inform us of how to improve the state-
of-the-art in the field of vulnerability discovery.
IX. CONCLUSION
This work presents an in-depth empirical study on artificial
vulnerability benchmarks, with the goal of understanding how
close these benchmarks represent the reality. To maintain the
generality and objectiveness, our study covers three most-used
artificial benchmarks of 2669 bugs and a diverse group of 80
real-world vulnerabilities. Our study follows a general model
of vulnerabilities and systematically compares the artificial
vulnerabilities against real ones. In short, our study centers
around three questions and finds that while artificial bench-
marks attempt to approach the reality, they still significantly
differ from the real world in several aspects. Last but not least,
following our study, we modify LAVA-M and propose a set of
strategies towards making artificial benchmarks more realistic.
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